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In response to the Respondent's brief, Appellant makes the following factual 
clarifications and legal arguments. 
A. Factual Clarifications 
The State inaccurately asserts "Officer Pattis, acting as an agent of the State of Idaho, 
instructed Pentico to leave certain State property, including the third floor of the Borah Building, 
and not return." Respondent's Brief, p. 5 (hereinafter R.B.) This attempt to recast the events 
into a situation contemplated by I.C. § 18-7008(8) ("leave" being the approximate equivalent of 
"depart from") is not supported by the record. On March 25, 2008, Officer Pattis (hereinafter 
Pattis) approached Appellant Pentico (hereinafter Pentico) within the vicinity of the Capitol 
Annex and advised him that he was no longer welcome on that property, and also added the 
Borah Building, third and fourth floor, and the Department of Education. l Pentico was never 
asked to leave the Borah Building; he was only told that he was not authorized to be there. On 
April 2, 2008, when Pentico was cited for trespass, he had been at the Borah Building, a different 
piece of State property from the property upon which he was standing when he was approached 
by Pattis on March 25,2008. 
The State pointlessly asserts, that Claudia Nalley (hereinafter Nalley), an assistant to the 
Governor, "testified that Pentico did not have an appointment or invitation and that he was not 
allowed on the premises." R.B. p. 5. This testimony appears to be seen by the State as proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that Pentico had no invitation. It cannot, however, be read as such. 
Pentico has consistently maintained that he had an open, unrevoked invitation from the Governor 
to have a meeting.2 He was precluded from offering evidence or testimony at trial relative to 
I Transcript of Trial, April 21, 2009 (hereinafter TR Trial) 19: 11-14, 20: 5-8 
2 Transcript of Motion Hearing, January 6, 2009 (hereinafter TR Motion) 6:2-14 
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this claim by the Trial Court's refusal to allow him to call the Governor as a witness or to testify 
regarding any "communication and prior dealings that Pentico may have had with other 
government officials as not relevant in this case.,,3 Nothing in this ruling reduced the need for 
the State to offer evidence which proves beyond a reasonable doubt that no invitation existed. 
The State called Nalley for testimony regarding the lack of an invitation and appointment. 
She testified that as the special assistant to the Governor, who works closely with him, she had 
no knowledge of the existence of an appointment or an invitation.4 In both respects she was 
asked "and to your knowledge." From these questions and the answers provided there was no 
indication that, even if she could have legally done so, that she was intending to testify as to 
matters beyond her own personal knowledge. Nor was it shown that Nalley personally knows 
everything that the Governor says and does or that she even talked to him about Pentico. Thus, 
while demonstrating that as far as she knew there was no invitation, it cannot be read as evidence 
that no invitation from the Governor existed. Nor is it appropriate, given that she would be 
incompetent to testify as to the Governor's knowledge, to infer the lack of any invitation from 
her testimony. 
The State asserts, "He [Pentico] did not testify that after Officer Pattis told him not to 
come on that property that he had received permission or an invitation to do so." R.B. p. 6. This 
assertion, while true, ignores that; 1) as noted above, Pentico was precluded from offering 
testimony of a standing invitation from the Governor; and 2) the State appears to be attempting 
to impermissibly shift the burden of proof. The statute refers to a person "who without 
permission or invitation" and by this reference makes the lack of an invitation an element of the 
3 TRMotion 18:3-8 
4 TR trial 37:6-12 and 39:17-21 
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crime which the State must prove. While it would have been helpful to both parties had Pentico 
been allowed to testify in this regard, he was not required to prove the presence of an invitation.s 
Thus, the absence of his testimony of the existence of an invitation is not relevant to the question 
of whether the State met its own burden of proof, which it did not do. 
B. Legal Argument 
The Magistrate's fmdings were not supported by substantial and competent evidence 
because the State did not establish that Pentico violated I.C § 18-7008(8). I.C. § 18-7008(8) is, 
in the context of this case, unconstitutionally overbroad and void for vagueness and this 
argument may be properly heard in this Appeal. 
1. The Magistrate Court's Findings Were Not Supported by Substantial and Competent 
Evidence and Should Be Overturned 
The State asserts that the record shows substantial evidence of all elements of trespassing. 
Specifically, that Pentico was asked by Officer Pattis to leave certain state property including the 
third floor of the Borah Building, that he entered the third floor of the Borah Building, and that 
he had no appointment or invitation.6 The State argues that because Nalley testified that as far as 
she knew, Pentico did not have an appointment or invitation and because Pentico did not testify 
that after Pattis told him not to come back he had received an invitation, he therefore must not 
have had an invitation.7 This argument is not supported by the record. 
5 In a trespass action involving State property, the prosecution might have a good deal of difficulty proving the lack 
of an invitation due to the fact that there are many people who could have given one. This problem would have been 
solved in this case ifPentico's testimony had not been excluded. Presumably he would then have testified that the 
Governor invited him and the State would have been free to call the Governor as a witness to afford the Court the 
opportunity to hear from the person with personal knowledge. 
6 Respondent's Brief, February 22,2011, p. 5. 
71d. pp. 5-6. 
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Again, as noted above, Pentico was never asked to leave the Borah Building, in fact, he 
was only told he was not authorized to be there. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that 
Pattis or Nalley were testifying based upon anyone's knowledge but their own. The record is 
devoid of any evidence that either knew of the Governor's prior invitation, meaning they were 
not competent to testify that Pentico had no open invitation from the Governor. Moreover, there 
is no evidence contradicting that Pattis had the authority to revoke or override the invitation. A 
conviction must be based upon substantial and competent evidence, and on this record the Court 
lacked substantial and competent evidence to convict in violation of I.e. § 18-7008(8) on the 
basis that Pentico went to the Borah Building without an invitation to do so. In re Doe, 147 
Idaho 243, 248, 207 P.3d 974, 979 (2009).8 
Finally, to generate a basis for criminal prosecution for trespass, there must be intent to 
damage land of another or lawfully sufficient circumstances which provide actual notice, relative 
to the borders of property subject to the trespass. Many sections of I.C. § 18-7008 are based 
solely upon intent to damage (1-7 and 10). The two remaining sections are based upon presence 
alone. Section (9) establishes clear signage requirements so that someone entering the land has 
notice. Section (8) requires presence upon the land at the time the individual is demanded to 
depart from the "same" land. The purpose of these two sections is clearly intended to establish 
notice of a claim of ownership of the particular parcel of land upon which the person is standing 
at the time of receiving notice. In Section (9) the prohibition upon entering properly posted 
property is indefinite and applies to all properly posted property; however, in Section (8) the 
8 The State points out that State's Exhibit 1 has not been included in the record on appeal but the lack of this trial 
exhibit in the record should not be confused with Pentico's reliance upon Appeal Exhibit #1 which is the Transcript 
of the hearing on January 6, 2009. See R. 95. 
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statute provides no means by which the one year prohibition can be extended beyond the 
property which is clearly the land on which the person is standing at the time of receiving notice. 
In fact, the statute makes clear that the one year prohibition applies only to entry upon "said 
property." 
Specifically the statute at issue states: 
Every person, except under landlord-tenant relationship, who, 
being first notified in writing, or verbally by the owner or 
authorized agent of the owner of real property, to immediately 
depart from the same and who refuses to so depart, or who, without 
permission or invitation, returns and enters said property within a 
year, after being so notified; 
I.e. § 18-7008 (8) (E.A.). The State, despite acknowledging the appropriate and applicable rules 
of statutory construction proceeds to ignore them completely in reaching the conclusion that it is 
"palpably absurd" to read this statute as limiting the effect of the notice (and hence the one year 
exclusion) to the property upon which the person is standing at the time of receiving the notice. 
As an alternative, the State offers a reading of the statute which is possible only if one is willing 
to read the words "depart from the same" as meaning something more than the property upon 
which the owner is standing at the time notice is given and the words "said property" to refer to 
any property identified at the time of giving notice. 
The State's reading of the statute would, for example, allow a rancher to exclude 
someone from his "ranch" while he is confronting that person at the grocery store (thus vitiating 
the clarity of actual notice). More tellingly, it also requires one to read the terms "the same" (as 
in "depart from the same") differently from the words "said property" (as in "returns and enters 
said property) and to completely ignore the words "returns" and "enters." The words "the same" 
must necessarily refer to the land where the person is standing at the time of receiving notice and 
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the first portion of the prohibited conduct must be the immediate departure from "the same." 
The words "the same" clearly and unambiguously refer to property where the alleged trespasser 
is physically standing at the time of receiving notice, furthermore it is not rational to suggest that 
the words "returns and enters said property" can be read to include any property other than the 
property upon which the trespasser is standing at the time of receiving notice. 
The State fails to cite to any authority for its interpretation of the statute and wholly fails 
to explain how its reading of the statute can be sustained without ignoring some of the plain 
words or applying uncommon meanings to those same words. This being the case, a prosecution 
of Pentico based upon entry of the Borah Building must be based upon evidence of a previous 
entry into the Borah Building and a request that he depart from the same. No such evidence 
exists in the record. 
For the above reasons the State failed to meet its burden. There was a severe lack of 
substantial and competent evidence sufficient to support any finding that Pentico violated the 
provisions ofLC.§ 18-7008(8). Pentico's conviction should be overturned. 
2. Pentico's Constitutional Challenges to his Conviction Should be Considered in this 
Court's Ultimate Decision 
Pentico has preserved the right to challenge the constitutional issues which are addressed 
in his appeal. However, in the alternative, any failure to preserve is due to ineffective assistance 
of counsel which is sufficient to excuse the failure. In any event, the claims that Pentico asserts 
involve fundamental errors by the lower courts and can be considered by this Court on appeal 
even if not preserved or if the failure to preserve is not attributed to ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
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i) Preserved for Appeal 
The State, without demonstrating that doing so is consistent with the record, places full 
reliance upon the erroneous decision entered by the District Court holding that Pentico failed to 
preserve his due process claims, including vagueness and overbreadth. In making this assertion, 
the State shows no recognition of the fact that several attempts were made by Pentico to assert 
constitutional and due process issues and he was precluded from doing so at every turn. As a 
consequence of not recognizing these efforts, the State makes no attempt to argue the underlying 
claims. 
The following excerpts are from the record on appeal which clearly demonstrate that 
Pentico's counsel was seeking to pursue constitutional and due process challenges and that the 
Trial Court understood Counsel's purpose: 
1) January 6, 2009 Hearing: 
a. Mr. Derr: " ... Mr. Pentico was pursuing constitutional rights such as 
free speech and grievance of government processes." (p. 8: 24-26) 
b. Mr. Derr: " ... The Idaho Supreme Court in Korsen indicated a strong 
probability that a trespass offense under 18-7008 would not be upheld 
if it arose out of a citizen's exercise of his First Amendment rights, 
stating that, assuming - and this is quote, "Assuming that a criminal 
trespass prosecution is files pursuant to Section 18-7008 against the 
person on public property who is exercising his or her free speech 
rights, the statute could be attacked as applied to that constitutionally 
protected conduct. "" 
c. Mr. Derr: "... based on the discussion that occurred at the Old 
Spaghetti Factory, he, I think, was entitled to believe that as far as the 
governor was concerned, he had an open invitation." (p. 15: 19-20) 
" ... there has to be a distinction made between types of public property 
... These are public areas that public generally has pretty much access 
to, and anything that attempts to not allow that, any such statute, must 
be strictly construed." (p. 16: 5-16) 
d. The Court: "with respect to the constitutional issue, it is well settled 
that any constitutional right is subject to reasonable restrictions in the 
time, place and manner in which those rights can be exercised. It 
seems to this court that the provisions of Idaho Code 18-7008 are very 
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reasonable restrictions. I'd also note that in no way is Mr. Pentico 
being prosecuted for the content of his communication, but rather for 
his conduct, and that is an important distinction. So I am going to 
deny the Motion to Dismiss on Constitutional Grounds. I think Idaho 
Code 18-7008 is Constitutional as applied." (pp. 17: 17-26, 18: 1) 
e. The Court: "The content of the communication and prior dealings that 
Mr. Pentico may have had with other government officials is not 
relevant in this case." (p. 18:4-6) 
2) April 21, 2009 Transcript of Proceedings: 
a. The Court: "... First Amendment matters, which is specifically not 
relevant to this trial, Mr. Derr. That's a legal question and I've ruled. 
We're not going to have testimony about whether Mr. Pentico's 
actions were justified under the First Amendment." (p. 5: 12-16) 
b. Mr. Derr: Even though our position is that that was an invitation that 
was never withdrawn. (p.7:19-20) 
c. Mr. Derr: "There is no doubt here that Mr. Pentico did go to the 
governor's office on April 2. The concern is the conversation of 3/25 
and other things that are missing from what I think are necessary for a 
criminal trespass conviction even if we're, as we seem to be doing in 
this case treating this as an ordinary simple trespass. There is no shred 
of evidence that he was a security risk. To trespass in the first place, 
there has to be some reason, in other words, otherwise a police officer 
can tell any of our citizens don't go to numerous public buildings, and 
if they go, they are subject to criminal trespass. What would that do to 
our system of government?" (pp. 60-61: 20-25, 1-10) 
d. Mr. Derr: "This case is much more than an ordinary trespass case 
which involves constitutional questions. We couldn't even deal with 
the "as applied" portion without having been allowed, which we're 
not, to go in and support those contentions." (p.62:17-21) 
It is clear from the statements cited to above that Pentico was precluded on several 
occasions from presenting evidence and argument regarding constitutional and due process 
violations. Trial Counsel Alan Derr, while not specifically stating the words, argued 
overbreadth and vagueness with references to an "as applied" challenge in State v. Korsen, 138 
Idaho 706, 69 P.3d 126 (2003) which itself grapples with these specific due process claims. 
Even more compelling is Derr's reference to "things that are missing from what I think are 
necessary for a criminal trespass conviction," "otherwise a police officer can tell any of our 
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citizens don't go to numerous public buildings, and if they go, they are subject to criminal 
trespass." This argument is specifically related to vagueness because the void-for-vagueness 
argument requires that when defining criminal conduct, a statute must be worded in a manner 
that does not allow arbitrary discriminatory enforcement. Korsen, 138 Idaho at 711. 
Trial Counsel could have been more explicit, but the District Court erred in concluding 
that he had not said enough to put the Trial Court on notice that he was arguing due process 
(vagueness and overbreadth) claims on behalf ofPentico. 
ii) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
If this Court determines that the record is not sufficient to support a [mding that the due 
process arguments were preserved for appeal, then it is appropriate for the Court to conclude that 
Pentico did not receive effective assistance of counsel. To claim ineffective assistance of 
counsel, the petitioner must demonstrate both prongs of what has become known as the 
Strickland test: "(1) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, 
and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result would have been 
different." State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, l36 (2008); Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (Strickland). "Because of the distorting effects of 
hindsight in reconstructing circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, there is a strong 
presumption that counsel's performance was within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance - that is, 'sound trial strategy'." Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 
1248 (Ct. App. 1989). A petitioner must overcome a strong presumption that counsel "rendered 
adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional 
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judgment" to establish that counsel's perfonnance was "outside the wide range of professionally 
competent assistance." Claibourne v. Lewis, 64 F.3d 1373, 1377 (9th Cir. 1995). 
The first element enunciated in Strickland, supra, is deficient perfonnance. The 
Strickland Court announced that this element "requires a showing that counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, at 687. It is hard to call to mind a right which is more 
significant than the right to due process and equally difficult to conjure up a valid strategy 
purpose for allowing a client to be prosecuted for a crime based upon an unconstitutionally 
vague and overly broad statute. 
To the extent that Trial Counsel was not clear enough to preserve the record as to these 
due process issues, he certainly was clear enough to show that he was attempting to make such a 
record and to have appropriate rulings protecting Pentico' s due process rights. This intent is 
made clear during the pre-trial discussion between Trial Counsel and the Trial Court. Sentencing 
in this matter was scheduled for February 10, 2009; Pentico had expressed his desire to enter a 
plea of guilty, but reserved the right to appeal the Court's ruling.9 However, at that time, Trial 
Counsel stated that after studying the transcripts and tapes of all the proceedings and the records, 
and after discussing the issues more thoroughly with his client, he instead requested a trial. 10 The 
Court inquired of Trial Counsel why he thought he had the ability to come in and ask for a do-
over. Trial Counsel responded that he "made a mistake that I thought a record existed that would 
justify an appeal. The record does not exist that justifies an appeal."ll It is clear that Trial 
9 Sentencing Hearing, February 10,2009,3:6-9 
to Id. 3:13-17 
II Id. 4: 17-20 
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Counsel never intended to abandon critical defense claims. Since the appropriate due process 
challenges were laid out for him in State v. Korsen (which he had cited to) it must be concluded 
that he either forgot about these claims or that he was intending to preserve them for appeal and 
did not get it done. Either way, if Pentico's due process claims have not been preserved for 
appeal than due to the very serious nature of the constitutional challenges asserted in this Appeal, 
it is apparent that Trial Counsel "made errors so serious that Counsel was not functioning as the 
'counsel' guaranteed the Defendant by the Sixth Amendment." 
The second element is prejudice. This element requires a showing that counsel's 
deficient performance actually had an adverse effect on his defense; i.e., but for counsel's 
deficient performance, there was a reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would have 
been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 at 693-95. To the extent it is correct to say that Trial 
Counsel failed to preserve the due process claims for appeal then it is clear that his failure to do 
so would have a significant adverse effect upon Pentico' s right to effective assistance of counsel. 
It is clear that Trial Counsel appreciated or at least should have appreciated the fact that the due 
process claims were not getting full consideration by the Trial Court which appeared to perceive 
that 1. C. § 18-7008(8) could be constitutionally applied, on state land, to permit exclusion of 
individuals from governmental offices and spaces, for any reason or no reason at all. Clearly, 
Trial Counsel appreciated that given the Trial Courts' ruling on constitutional matters, he could 
not win at trial and proceeded in a manner intended to preserve meritorious matters for appeal. If 
in fact the arguments are not preserved then Trial Counsel's deficient representation adversely 
affected Pentico by placing him in the position of having the Courts of this State perceive that he 
waived his due process challenges to the application ofLC. § 18-7008(8) to his conduct. 
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If Pentico's due process challenges, as laid out in State v. Korsen, have not been 
preserved for appeal then he has been denied effective assistance of counsel and he should not be 
held to have waived those challenges. The challenges are obvious. In the absence of any valid 
reason for doing so, the failure to adequately raise due process challenges with sufficient clarity 
to preserve those challenges for an appeal when a conviction appears imminent must reasonably 
be seen as sufficiently deficient and damaging as to meet the Strikland criteria for determining 
that a Sixth Amendment violation has occurred. 
iii) Fundamental Error 
Finally, this Court can also address those constitutional and due process challenges to 
prevent fundamental error. The fundamental error analysis under the most recent Idaho law 
includes a three prong test wherein the defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate 
court that the: 
2010). 
"alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional 
rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in 
the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a 
tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless. If the defendant persuades the appellate court 
that the complained of errors satisfies this three-prong inquiry, then the appellate court 
shall vacate and remand." 
State v. Perry, Docket No. 34846, 2010 Opinion No. 130, at p. 22 (Idaho, December 7, 
Pentico has not waived any aspect of his constitutional right to due process of law. The 
State, while claiming in general terms that Pentico cannot make an adequate showing on any of 
the prongs of the test, fails to point to portions of the record in which Pentico waives any rights. 
In Idaho, a defendant may waive a right of constitutional magnitude provided it is shown that he 
did so knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently. State v. Kirkwood, 111 Idaho 623, 626, 726 P.2d 
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735, 738 (1986). The record is devoid of any pleading, testimony or statement of either Pentico 
or Trial Counsel which can be read as a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of the right to 
assert due process challenges of vagueness and overbreadth. 
The error is plainly visible in the record without the need for additional information, 
including information as to whether the failure to object was tactical. As has been discussed 
above, Trial Counsel purposely tried to create a record and pursue the constitutional challenges, 
thus, any failure to do so cannot be attributed to a tactical decision. Moreover, the facts upon 
which the prosecution proceeded are abundantly clear in the record and the rulings that are 
challenged are likewise clear. This is not a situation in which Pentico needs the benefit of 
additional evidence in order to state and support his constitutional challenge to a prosecution, 
given the record in this case, for a violation ofLC. § 18-7008(8). 
This error was clearly not harmless. This is the only prong of the test stated in Perry 
about which the State actually attempts to frame an argument. In this regard the State appears 
to be arguing that because Pentico appreciates that, if applied as written, the statute would 
clearly allow a person to be thrown off of property and thereafter excluded for one year for any 
reason or no reason at all, and because he was informed as to which properties that exclusion 
extended, he cannot claim the statute is overly broad or vague. What the State fails to address is 
that Pentico's challenge to the statute derives from the way in which the Trial Court, has, given 
the facts of this case, applied the statute to State owned land which is land that citizens would 
and do freely enter for the purpose of exercising protected first amendment rights. 
When the Trial Court ruled that the statute was a reasonable time, place and manner 
restriction and precluded any testimony regarding the circumstances which lead up to the 
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original notice to depart, March 25,2008, it applied the statute in a manner which is inherently 
flawed. A statute which allows for preclusion from a traditional public forum for any reason or 
no reason at all cannot be found to be a reasonable restriction because it is fundamentally 
arbitrary. On March 25, 2008, Pentico had no notice that his conduct was about to get him 
excluded from the Capital Annex or any other public buildings. His exclusion was, to the best 
that can be determined on this record, completely arbitrary and not based on any questionable or 
inappropriate conduct on his part. 
When the Trial Court ruled that Pentico could be prosecuted for a return to certain State 
property (which is a traditional public forum) within one year, it adopted an interpretation of the 
statute which renders it overly broad. Such a law would constitute an impermissible prior 
restraint on protected speech and access to government because it gives no regard to the content 
of that speech, the reason for seeking access, nor does it provide any procedural due process. 
When the Trial Court ruled that the exclusion could be extended to property other than 
the one upon which the notice was given, it adopted an interpretation of the statute which 
renders it intolerably vague. The statute provides no standards which allow the public official 
or the excluded person to determine the public property to which the exclusion can or may be 
extended to. A court called upon to determine if the extension of the exclusion was a 
permissible imposition upon an individual's right would be completely without standards by 
which to measure the merits of the exclusion. Thus, while he knew that Pattis had told him not 
to go to the Governor's office, Pentico could not look at I.C. § 18-7008(8) and discern from that 
statute that it gave force oflaw to Pattis' edict. 
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Pentico did not waive any constitutional rights, in fact, as noted above, he specifically 
tried to preserve them, the error plainly exists in the record and the error was not harmless. For 
the reasons stated above Pentico' s appeal regarding constitutional and due process challenges 
should be considered by this Court in order to prevent fundamental error. 
3. I.C. § 18-7008 (8) is Unconstitutional because it is Impermissibly Vague and 
Overbroad "As Applied" to Public Property and Pentico; Furthermore the Statute 
does not Provide Pentico with Proper Due Process as Required by the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution as Applied to the State of Idaho 
Through the 14th Amendment and the Idaho Constitution Art. 1, Sec. 13 
Where the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance is challenged, the lower court's 
determination is reviewed de novo. State v. Hammersley, 134 Idaho 816, 818, 10 P.3d 1285, 
1287 (2000). The party challenging a statute on constitutional grounds bears the burden of 
establishing that the statute is unconstitutional and must overcome a strong presumption of 
validity. State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003). Appellate courts are 
obligated to seek an interpretation of a statute that upholds its constitutionality. Id. 
i) Procedural Due Process 
Pentico has argued that the application of the statute to preclude him from returning to 
the designated property for a period of one year effects a depravation of his constitutionally 
protected rights without due process of law. The State, unable to point to any provision for due 
process associated with the one year exclusion, argues instead that Pentico has failed to provide 
any authority "even suggesting that his ability to physically enter the Captiol Annex or the third 
and fourth floors of the Borah Building was a significant liberty or property interest." R.B. p. 
13. This view of the case is probably a byproduct of the fact that the State appears to be doing 
all that it can to ignore anything other than the fact that Pentico went to the reception area of the 
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Governor's office after he was told not to. However, the problem with this myopic approach to 
the case is it does nothing to address the question of whether anyone had a lawful right to tell 
Pentico not to go to the Governor's office. As the State is asking this Court to interpret the law, 
it would provide license to governmental officials to freely discriminate against state citizens by 
excluding them for a full year from State properties where people typically would freely go in 
order to exercise protected fIrst amendment freedoms and to do so with no apparent or 
reasonable justifIcation and no opportunity to be heard. 12 
At stake in this case, are at a minimum, the rights protected by the First Amendment of 
the United States Constitution which are extended to the citizens of this State through the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Most of the same rights are afforded Pentico 
by the Idaho Constitution, Art 1, Sections 9 &13. While the record is impaired in this case by 
the Trial Court's evidentiary rulings, it is clear that Pentico's history of interaction with elected 
and appointed governmental officials was sufficient to allow Pattis to anticipate several 
facilities which Pentico could be expected to go to in order to pursue his agenda. Thus, it is 
apparent that the effect ofPattis' order, as the State seeks to enforce it, is that without regard to 
what he might have to say or what he might be seeking to do, Pentico was excluded from going 
to facilities which are either traditional public forums, public forums, or the accepted places 
where one might seek to speak to a governmental official about a grievance. This is an 
impermissible prior restraint. See Forsynth County v. Nationalist Movement, 506 U.S. 123, 130 
12 It should be noted that this procedural due process issue does not come up in nor is it decided in Korsen because 
Korsen was prosecuted for a failure to depart, not a for a return within one year. 
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(1982).13 This is restraint is all the more significant given Pentico' s established interest in being 
active in the political process. This, not only does the one year exclusion adversely impact 
substantial rights, there is no established procedure for him to either challenge the initial 
exclusion or modify the one year absolute exclusion from any properties to which the absolute 
exclusion actually applies. 
ii) Void for Vagueness Challenge 
It does not appear that the State makes any direct attempt to argue against Pentico's claim 
that the statute is impermissibly vague as applied to him. Instead it appears that the State wants 
to avoid the whole issue and asks the Court to focus, as the courts below did, solely upon the 
events of April 2, 2008. The argument made in that regard is that Pentico had no discernable 
first amendment right which was impaired by Pattis' order that he refrain from going to the 
Governor's office after March 25, 2008. This argument results from either a misunderstanding 
of the core challenge involved in a void for vagueness claim or a hope that attention can be 
deflected away from the void for vagueness claim. 
Conversely, Pentico has made clear and precise arguments regarding void-for vagueness. 
Pentico's void for vagueness argument focuses exclusively on Pattis' conduct on March 25, 
2008. On March 25, 2008, Pattis advised Pentico that he was "no longer authorized" to be at 
three separate government buildings, there was no discernable justification for this order other 
than that Pentico was at the Capital Annex to exercise his First Amendment rights. This ban has 
now become the basis of a prosecution pursuant to I.C. § 18-7008(8). There are three separate 
13 This statute is also being used to criminalize symbolic speech. A trip to the public reception area at the 
Governor's office for the purpose of personally hand delivering a letter which could have been mailed, conveys a 
sense of urgency. This conduct is inherently expensive and conveys a meaning without the benefit of explanatory 
speech. See, e.g. Rumsfeldv. Forum/or Academic and Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006). 
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respects in which this prosecution is only possible if the statute is given an interpretation which 
renders it manifestly vague. 
First, Pentico was ultimately convicted based upon a statute which was different from the 
statutes originally relied upon by both Pattis and the Ada County Prosecutor. Pattis, who had 
told Pentico he would be prosecuted if he returned and therefore must have had time to 
determine what law appeared to apply, cited Pentico with a violation of I.C. § 18-7011. When 
this charge was facing dismissal, the Ada County Prosecutor, who had plenty of notice of the 
need to fmd applicable law, amended to a violation of I.C.§ 18-7008. Then, when this second 
charge was facing dismissal the prosecutor amended again to I.C. § 18-7008(8). While citizens 
are expected to know the law, it is difficult to expect them to understand the applicability of a 
particular law when neither the law enforcement officer nor the prosecutor, who both have 
training and the benefit of substantial resources, are able to fmd the statute ultimately applied to 
be sufficiently clear that it can be identified by either of them. 
Second, as argued above, I.C. § 18-7008(8) does not, on its face, give any indication that 
the exclusion can be extended beyond the four comers of the property on which the person is 
standing at the time of receiving the notice of exclusion. Even if a reason could be conjured for 
construing the law in this manner, that action would have to be based upon a determination that 
the seemingly clear language of the statute was in fact ambiguous and in need of judicial 
construction. However, the very act of having to do so is an acknowledgement that the statute is 
on its face vague about whether it can be extended to a property other than the one upon which 
notice of exclusion is given. 
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Third, assuming for argument sake that Pentico could anticipate the applicability of the 
statute that Pattis was apparently not referring to, this does nothing to change the fact that the 
prosecution of Pentico for a violation of this statute constitutes an arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement of the statute. The property in question in this case is public property, not private 
property. Not only was it public property but the acting Capital which was a traditional public 
forum. The reception area of the Governor's office, while not so clearly a traditional public 
forum, is likely a public forum but in any event, is a space which is open to the public who are 
seeking contact with or assistance from the Governor or his staff. These types of public 
property are materially different from private property. 
Clearly, the owner of private property may personally or through an agent preclude a 
person from entering hislher property for any or no reason at all. This unfettered discretion 
makes sense as to private property because the private property owner has constitutionally 
protected rights to the use and control of his or her property. 
The same cannot be said as to state or public property. This case amply demonstrates 
that allowing I.C. § 18-7008(8) to be read as empowering a state actor to exclude people from 
being on or entering state land for any reason or no reason at all will lead to criminalizing the 
polite and cordial exercise of the constitutional right to engage in political speech, symbolic 
speech or an attempt to seek access to government officials to seek assistance with grievances or 
other legitimate concerns. 
Applying this statute to confer the power to exclude Idaho citizens from the use of state 
land where there is no inappropriate conduct in the first instance, to extend the exclusion to land 
other than the one upon which notice was given and to exclude them for a year without regard to 
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whether their conduct on subsequent visits will confonn to reasonable expectations, cannot be 
constitutionally sustained. The statute simply gives no reasonable notice to Pentico or anyone 
else that any of this is possible when they are given notice of exclusion while they are lawfully 
upon State land to exercise constitutionally protected rights or to engage in behaviors which are 
consistent with what other members of the public can engage in upon the same property. 
Moreover, the statute gives no reasonable guidance to law enforcement or the courts to permit a 
rational detennination of the circumstances in which any of these things could in fact be 
permissible. For these reasons the statute as applied in this case is impermissibly vague and a 
violation ofPentico's due process rights. The State has made no attempt to argue otherwise. 
iii) Overbreadth Challenge 
Pentico's overbreadth challenge arises from the fact that I.C. § 18-7008(8) as applied in 
this case is using Pentico's March 25, 2008, wholly protected presence upon State land, as a 
basis for criminalizing his subsequent use of State land for purposes which are completely 
consistent with the purposes for which that land is open to all free Idaho citizens except Pentico. 
As the State seeks to have the statute applied, the only way that Pentico could have avoided 
prosecution was to forego, for at least a year, engaging in the very types of protected and legal 
conduct in which he previously engaged. 
The State, without explaining how this Court can join it, seeks to ignore the flaw inherent 
with allowing the events of March 25, 2008, to serve as the predicate to a prosecution. The 
problem with this approach is that the record will not support any conclusion or inference that 
Pentico did anything more on March 25, 2008, than engage in wholly protected expression and 
communication with the Government regarding grievances. This being the case, the State is, 
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without admitting it, arguing that proper and legal use of a traditional public forum for wholly 
protected purposes can legally serve as the basis for a one year absolute exclusion from that and 
any other identified State land. Putting aside the fact that such a law would have overwhelming 
prior restraint problem, this argument makes no sense and is unsustainable. 
Implicitly recognizing the impossibility formulating an argument for the validity of the 
exclusion edict given on March 25, 2008, the State elects to proceed as though it is 
presumptively valid and appears to be responding to Pentico's assertion that, as applied to him, 
I.C. § 18-7008 (8) is unconstitutionally overly broad with following arguments: 1) the State 
contends that Pentico was prosecuted for his physical presence at the Governor's office and not 
for the exercise of any right; 2) the State contends the right to hand deliver a letter to the 
Governor's office is not a right protected by the Constitution because it is not a form of 
expression; and 3) the State argues that it has the right to regulate the use of public property and 
to prohibit exercises of free speech on property which is a non-pUblic forum. Each of these 
arguments fails to respond to the issues presented by this case. 
The State's first and third arguments are without merit in the context of this case. Pentico 
was not prosecuted solely for physical presence at the Governor's office or for any independently 
wrongful conduct while he was there. He could have lawfully gone there to hand deliver a letter, 
but (or, the challenged prior exclusion by Pattis. The State does not and, indeed, cannot point to 
any generally applicable statute or regulation which prohibits Idaho citizens from hand 
delivering documents to the Governor's office. This fact presents a critical distinction between 
this case and Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) upon which the State hinges its argument. 
In that case the prosecution proceeded upon a statute which focused on the conduct, on the day 
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of the trespass charge. The statute applied to the conduct at issue in Adderly prohibited activites 
which resulted in blocking the nonpublic driveway into the county jail (a "security facility') and 
which had a malicious or mischievous intent. The Court found the finding of malicious or 
mischievous intent was supported by the record and for this reason the statute was sufficiently 
narrow in its focus so as to warrant prosecution even though the conduct at issue in Adderly was 
intended to be a protest against governmental abuses of power. 
Adderly is not relevant to the issues presented in this case. Here, there is not so much as a 
scrap of evidence which suggests that while he was at the Governor's Office, Pentico did 
anything which is outside the ordinary course of business for the reception area of a 
governmental office or behaved in any manner which violated any statute other than, if it applies, 
I.C. § 18-7008(8). Thus, it is clear that Pentico was not prosecuted based upon a statute which is 
predicated solely upon the events of April 2, 2008. In this regard, the overbreadth issue which 
the Court must address and which the State steadfastly refuses to address is: Is the State seeking 
an impermissibly broad application ofI.C. § 18-7008(8) when it seeks, without any evidence of 
prior illegal, improper or unprotected conduct, to criminalize, for a period of one year, an entry 
upon State land which is otherwise open to the public for the exact purpose pursued there by the 
Defendant. The State fails to explain how this query can be answered with a negative response. 
The State's second response to Pentico's overbreadth challenge is premised upon the 
assertion that hand delivering a letter to the Governor's office is not a protected right, apparently 
suggesting that assertion as the end of the inquiry. Aside from making this assertion, the State 
does little to explain how, even assuming it is accurate, it is relevant to the resolution of 
Pentico's overbreadth challenge. If Pattis' initial exclusion is not valid because the statute 
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cannot be read so broadly as to permit exclusion from a traditional public forum and other 
governmental offices for nothing more than speaking to a legislator about matters of concern to 
the citizen, then the fact that Pentico was not exercising a protected right on April 2, 2008, is 
irrelevant. Even if Pattis' initial exclusion could be found to be valid, the statute cannot be read 
so broadly as to extend without regard to manner or content to otherwise protected speech or 
political conduct or otherwise legal and common conduct in public spaces for a period of one 
year. To the extent that either or both of these assertions are true, then the predicate to 
prosecution for entering the Governor's office goes away and what was accomplished in that 
office is actually irrelevant unless it independently gave rise to criminal charges. 
Even if it were necessary for Pentico to point to a specific protected act which was 
impaired by application of I.C. § 18-7008(8), he was engaging in conduct which could be 
lawfully done by any other citizen (which cannot of course be said about trespass upon private 
property) and which was inherently expressive of the importance he placed upon his grievances. 
For each and all of the reasons identified above, giving I.C. § 18-7008(8) sufficient force 
and effect to permit this prosecution cannot be accomplished without causing it to be 
unconstitutionally overly broad. 
C. Conclusion 
The Trial Court's application of I.e. § 18-7008(8) to Pentico was not supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. Pentico's constitutional and due process challenges can and 
should be addressed by this Court. Finally, I.C. § 18-7008(8) is unconstitutionally vague and 
overbroad as applied to Pentico and public property. Pentico's conviction should be reversed 
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and the matter should be remanded to the Trial Court with instructions to dismiss the charge with 
prejudice. 
DATED this 5th day of Aprils 2011. 
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